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Abstract
Defeasible logics provide several linguistic features to support the expression of defeasible knowledge.
There is also a wide variety of such logics, expressing different intuitions about defeasible reasoning. How-
ever, the logics can only combine in trivial ways. This limits their usefulness in contexts where different
intuitions are at play in different aspects of a problem. In particular, in some legal settings, different actors
have different burdens of proof, which might be expressed as reasoning in different defeasible logics.
In this paper, we introduce annotated defeasible logic as a flexible formalism permitting multiple forms
of defeasibility, and establish some properties of the formalism.
This paper is under consideration for acceptance in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming.
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Introduction
In some application domains, for example legal reasoning, knowing that something holds (or it
is presumed to hold) is not enough to draw further conclusions from it. One has to determine
to what degree one can assert that it holds. In other words statements in rules (here we use
the term ‘rule’ to indicate a mechanism/principle to assert conclusions from already established
assertions) have an associated proof standard. Accordingly, a party wanting to assert a particular
assertion has the burden to prove that assertion with the appropriate standard (or a stronger one).
Consider the following rule:
IllegalBehaviour ,¬Justification ⇒ Liability
Suppose there is factual evidence about the illegal behaviour. The information in the rule is
not enough, since it does not prescribe the burden needed to assess whether the behaviour was
justified or not. According to (Prakken and Sartor 2007; Governatori and Sartor 2010), in a civil
case the lack of justification is subject to the so-called burden of production, i.e., there is a
credible argument for it, while in a criminal case the burden of persuasion applies (i.e., more
sceptical reasoning must be used).
Let us consider a concrete scenario. Party A caused some injuries to B. Party A was much
stronger than Party B, and thus the action causing injury is not justified. On the other hand, Party
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A claims that they acted in self defence since they were under threat from Party B. The scenario
can now be modelled by the rules:
Injury ,¬Justification ⇒ Liability
Threat ⇒ Justification
Stronger ⇒ ¬Justification
Here, in case we are not able to assess whether the threat was real, we have a credible argument
for ¬Justification (because Party A is stronger), but we do not have a sceptical argument for it
(because it might be that the threat was real, and then the outcome from the two conflicting rules
is undetermined). Thus, we can establish liability in a civil case, but Party A is not criminally
liable. Accordingly, we can reformulate the initial rule in the following two principles:
Tort ,BurdenProduction(¬Justification) ⇒ CivilCaseLiability
Crime,BurdenPersuasion(¬Justification) ⇒ CriminalCaseLiability
whereBurdenProduction andBurdenPersuasion are annotations describing themode in which
we have to prove the lack of justification for the illegal behaviour.
Legal reasoning has developed so-called proof standards (e.g., scintilla of evidence, substantial
evidence, preponderance of evidence, beyond reasonable doubt) according to which assertions
have to be justified. (Gordon and Walton 2009) proposed to encode proof standards using rule-
based argumentation with salience, and (Governatori 2011) shows how to represent the proof
standards of (Gordon and Walton 2009) where, essentially, each proof standard corresponds to a
different degree of provability in some defeasible logic variant. In particular, (Governatori 2011)
argues that the proof standard of beyond reasonable doubt corresponds to provability in the am-
biguity propagating variant of defeasible logic. However, as the following example illustrates
there are examples where more than one such proof standards must be used. This means that
incompatible variants of defeasible logic have to work side-by-side.
Suppose that a piece of evidenceA suggests that the defendant in a legal case is not responsible
while a second piece of evidence B indicates that he/she is responsible; moreover, the sources
are equally reliable. According to the underlying legal system a defendant is presumed innocent
(i.e., not guilty) unless responsibility has been proved (beyond reasonable doubt).
The above scenario is encoded by the following rules:
r1 : EvidenceA ⇒ ¬Responsible
r2 : EvidenceB ⇒ Responsible r3 : Responsible ⇒ Guilty
r4 : ⇒ ¬Guilty
where r3 is stronger than r4. Given both EvidenceA and EvidenceB , the literal Responsible
is ambiguous. There are applicable rules (r1 and r2) for and against the literal, with no way to
adjudicate between them. As a consequence r3 is not applicable, and so there is no applicable
rule arguing against the presumption of innocence (rule r4). In an ambiguity blocking setting we
obtain a ¬Guilty verdict; the ambiguity about responsibility is blocked from applying toGuilty .
In contrast, in an ambiguity propagating setting, the ambiguity of Responsible propagates to
Guilty , and thus the literals Guilty and ¬Guilty are ambiguous too; hence an undisputed con-
clusion cannot be drawn. When we look at the example above, is it appropriate to say that we
have reached a not guilty verdict without any reasonable doubt? The evidence supporting that
the defendant was responsible has not been refuted. This example supports the contention of
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(Governatori 2011) that ambiguity propagating inference is a more appropriate representation of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Let us extend the scenario. Suppose that the legal system allows for compensation for wrongly
accused people. A person (defendant) has been wrongly accused if the defendant is found in-
nocent, where innocent is defined as ¬Guilty . In addition, by default, people are not entitled to
compensation. The additional elements of this scenario are modelled by the rules:
r5 : ¬Guilty ⇒ Compensation
r6 : ⇒ ¬Compensation
where r5 is stronger than r6.
In the full scenario, the defendant is not found innocent, and so is not entitled to compensation.
If we take a purely ambiguity blocking stance then, since we are not able to determine whether
there was responsibility, the defendant is not guilty, and then the defendant is entitled to com-
pensation. On the other hand, in a purely ambiguity propagating setting,Guilty and ¬Guilty are
ambiguous, and this makes Compensation and ¬Compensation ambiguous; we are in a posi-
tion where we cannot decide whether the defendant is entitled or not to compensation. Thus, both
choices are unsatisfactory: either the defendant receives compensation despite not being found
innocent or no decision is made about compensation.
What we want is a regime where we can reason about guilt in an ambiguity propagating way,
but then reason about compensation in an ambiguity blocking way. This can be achieve by re-
placing rule r5 with
r′5 : BeyondReasonableDoubt (¬Guitly)⇒ Compensation
where, similarly to what we have done in the previous example, BeyondReasonableDoubt is
an annotation to the literal ¬Guilty that holds in case the literal is provable under ambiguity
propagation, and the proof standard for Compensation can be chosen to be ambiguity blocking.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a formalism – annotated defeasible logic – in which
such distinctions can be expressed, define its semantics, and investigate properties of the formal-
ism.
This paper is organised as follows. In the next section we provide brief background on de-
feasible logics. We then introduce annotated defeasible logic, and define its behaviour with a
meta-program. In the following section we establish some properties of annotated defeasible
logic, including its relationship to existing defeasible logics and the relative inference strength
of the additional inference rules we introduce. Finally, we show that annotated defeasible logic
has the flexibility to deal with different notions of failure, corresponding to different semantics
of negation-as-failure in logic programs. Due to space limitations, parts of the paper – includ-
ing proof sketches – are presented in the supplementary material accompanying the paper at the
TPLP archive.
Defeasible Logics
In this section we can only present an outline of defeasible logics. Further details can be obtained
from (Billington et al. 2010) and the references therein. We address propositional defeasible log-
ics, but many results should extend to a first-order language.
A defeasible theory is built from a language Σ of literals (which we assume is closed under
negation) and a language Λ of labels. A defeasible theory D = (F,R,>) consists of a set of
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facts F , a finite set of rulesR, each rule with a distinct label from Λ, and an acyclic relation> on
Λ called the superiority relation. This syntax is uniform for all the logics considered here. Facts
are individual literals expressing indisputable truths. Rules relate a set of literals (the body),
via an arrow, to a literal (the head), and are one of three types: a strict rule, with arrow →; a
defeasible rule, with arrow⇒; or a defeater, with arrow❀. Strict rules represent inferences that
are unequivocally sound if based on definite knowledge; defeasible rules represent inferences that
are generally sound. Inferences suggested by a defeasible rule may fail, due to the presence in the
theory of other rules. Defeaters do not support inferences, but may impede inferences suggested
by other rules. The superiority relation provides a local priority on rules with conflicting heads.
Strict or defeasible rules whose bodies are established defeasibly represent claims for the head of
the rule to be concluded.When both a literal and its negation are claimed, the superiority relation
contributes to the adjudication of these conflicting claims by an inference rule, leading (possibly)
to a conclusion.
Defeasible logics derive conclusions that are outside the syntax of the theories. Conclusions
may have the form +dq, which denotes that under the inference rule d the literal q can be con-
cluded, or −dq, which denotes that the logic can establish that under the inference rule d the
literal q cannot be concluded. The syntactic element d is called a proof tag. In general, neither
conclusion may be derivable: q cannot be concluded under d, but the logic is unable to establish
that. Tags +∆ and −∆ represent monotonic provability (and unprovability) where inference is
based on facts, strict rules, and modus ponens. We assume these tags and their inference rules are
present in every defeasible logic. What distinguishes a logic is the inference rules for defeasible
reasoning. The four logics discussed in (Billington et al. 2010) correspond to four different pairs
of inference rules, tagged ∂, δ, ∂∗, and δ∗; they produce conclusions of the form (respectively)
+∂q, −∂q, +δq, −δq, etc., where q is a literal. These logics all abide by the Principle of Strong
Negation (Antoniou et al. 2000), which asserts that the condition for applying a −d inference
rule should be the strong negation of the condition for applying +d. The inference rules δ and
δ∗ require auxiliary tags and inference rules, denoted by σδ and σδ∗ , respectively
1, expressing
that there is at least (weak) support for the conclusion. These inference rules are available in the
supplementary material. For each of the four principal defeasible tags d, the corresponding logic
is denoted by DL(d). We write D ⊢ +dq (respectively,D ⊢ −dq) if +dq (−dq) can be proved
byDL(d).
The four principal tags and corresponding inference rules represent different intuitions about
defeasible reasoning, that is, define different forms of defeasibility: in ∂ and ∂∗ ambiguity is
blocked, while in δ and δ∗ ambiguity is propagated; in ∂ and δ rules for a literal act as a team to
overcome competing rules, while in ∂∗ and δ∗ an individual rule must overcome all competing
rules. The scenario in the introduction with rules r1−r4 exemplifies the treatments of ambiguity.
For an example of team defeat, consider rules s1 and s2 for q and rules s3 and s4 for ¬q, with
s1 > s3 and s2 > s4; then no individual rule for q can overcome the rules for ¬q, but s1 and s2 –
as a team – can, because every rule for¬q is overridden by some rule in the team. Amore detailed
discussion of ambiguity and team defeat in theDL framework is given in (Billington et al. 2010;
Maher 2012).
In (Maher and Governatori 1999; Antoniou et al. 2000), the inference rules inDL(d) were re-
formulated as a meta-programMd: a logic program that takes a representation of a defeasible
1 Note that in previous works these have been denoted by σ and σ∗ or
∫
and
∫
∗
. This change of notation is made to
accommodate new forms of support introduced in this paper.
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theory D as input and specifies what conclusions can be drawn from the theory according to
the d inference rules. (The combined meta-program and theory is denoted byMd(D).) We will
take this meta-programming formulation as our starting point, rather than the inference rules
as presented in (Billington et al. 2010), for example. This meta-program formulation is given in
the supplementary material. We assume, initially, that the logic programming semantics in use
is Kunen’s semantics (Kunen 1987), which expresses the 3-valued logical consequences of the
Clark completion of a logic program. Equivalently, Kunen’s semantics is the set of all conse-
quences of Φ ↑ n for any finite n, where Φ is Fitting’s semantic function for logic programs
(Fitting 1985). (Fitting’s semantics, which is the least fixedpoint of Φ, expresses the logical con-
sequences of 3-valued Herbrand models of the Clark completion of a logic program.)
Although defeasible logics are usually founded on proofs, there are alternative semantics for
these logics: a model-theoretic semantics was defined in (Maher 2002), a denotational seman-
tics forDL(∂) was presented in (Maher 2000), and an argumentation semantics forDL(∂) was
given in (Governatori et al. 2004). Each of these approaches provides an alternative characteri-
zation of the conclusions derivable by proofs in the logic. However, in this paper we only use the
meta-programming formulation of the proof systems.
In the following, annotated defeasible logic will be defined as an integration of the four defea-
sible logics discussed above. However, it should be clear that the same approach can be applied
to any set of defeasible logics employing the same logic programming semantics.
Annotated Defeasible Logic
Annotated defeasible logic is the formalism we propose, motivated by the discussion in the in-
troduction. We begin by addressing its syntax, which is an extension of the syntax of defeasible
logics.
A tag is any one of the proof tags, or the additional tag free. An annotated literal has the form
t q, where t is a tag and q is a literal. An annotated defeasible rule has the form
r : L1, . . . , Ln ⇒ q
where r is a label, q is a literal and eachLi is either an annotated literal or a fail-expression, where
a fail-expression has the form fail L, where L is an annotated literal. An annotated defeater is
defined similarly; strict rules are not annotated.
Roughly, the meaning of a rule
r : t1 q1, . . . , tn qn, fail tn+1 qn+1, . . . , fail tm qm ⇒ q
is that if qi can be proved using inference rule ti, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and proof of qi can be
demonstrated to fail using inference rule ti, for n + 1 ≤ i ≤ m, then we have a prima facie
reason to infer q. As with all defeasible logics, such an inference can be overridden by another
rule.
A proof tag only indicates which inference rule should be applied to resolve conflict con-
cerning that literal. Thus, an annotated literal t q is asking, roughly, for +t q to be proved. A
fail-expression fail t q is asking, roughly, for −t q to be proved. The free tag has a different
meaning than the proof tags. A free literal freeqi must be proved by the same inference rule
that is intended to prove q. This provides a mechanism by which defeasible rules can be agnostic
as to inference rule, which can be determined later, just as defeasible rules in current defeasible
logics are.
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An annotated defeasible theory is a defeasible theory where the defeasible rules are anno-
tated and fail-expressions are allowed. Alternatively, we can think of an annotated defeasible
theory as consisting of an unannotated defeasible theory (the underlying theory) D that allows
fail-expressions, and an annotation function α that maps each body literal occurrence to its an-
notation. In this case we denote the annotated defeasible theory by α(D). We can consider α
a total function, or consider it a partial function mapping literal occurrences to proof tags. The
unmapped literals are free.
We now turn to expressing the meaning of annotated defeasible theories using the meta-
programming approach. The semantics of a theory is parameterized by a logic programming
semantics, which is applied to a meta-program.
Given an annotated defeasible theory D = (F,R,>), the theory is represented by facts as
follows:
1. fact(p). if p ∈ F
2. strict(ri, p, [L1, . . . , Ln]). if ri : L1, . . . , Ln → p ∈ R
3. defeasible(ri, p, [L1, . . . , Ln]). if ri : L1, . . . , Ln ⇒ p ∈ R
4. defeater(ri, p, [L1, . . . , Ln]). if ri : L1, . . . , Ln ❀ p ∈ R
5. sup(ri, rj). for each pair of rules such that ri > rj
where the Li are annotated literals or fail-expressions.
The meta-program to which these facts are input is denoted by M, while the combination
ofM and the representation of D is denoted byM(D). In what follows, we permit ourselves
some syntactic flexibility in presenting the meta-program. (For example, we enumerate a list
instead of explicitly iterating over it, and express the complementation operation∼as a function2.
Furthermore, tags and fail are unary functors.) However, there is no technical difficulty in using
conventional logic programming syntax to represent this program.
Before we get to the predicates that define the meaning of theories, we define some auxiliary
predicates.
As discussed in the introduction to defeasible logics, the different proof tags represent different
forms of defeasibility. In particular, some forms block ambiguity, while others propagate ambi-
guity; some use team defeat, while others require an individual rule to overcome all conflicting
rules. The following facts are used to specify, for each proof tag: that it is a proof tag, whether it
expresses team defeat or individual defeat, and whether the inference rule blocks or propagates
ambiguity. Strictly speaking, we should distinguish the proof tags appearing syntactically inM
from the tags appearing in conclusions (which are not part of the syntax of defeasible logics, but
part of its meta-theory). However, because there is a clear correspondence between the two, we
find it clearer to use the same symbol for both.
team(∂).
team(δ).
indiv(∂∗).
indiv(δ∗).
ambiguity blocking(∂∗).
ambiguity blocking(∂).
ambiguity propagating(δ∗).
ambiguity propagating(δ).
proof tag(∂∗).
proof tag(∂).
proof tag(δ∗).
proof tag(δ).
2 The complement of p is ¬p and the complement of ¬p is p. ∼ is unrelated to fail, since it is the complement of
classical negation.
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The following clauses define the class of all rules and the class of supportive rules. Defeaters
are not supportive rules because they can only be used to prevent other conclusions; they cannot
support any conclusion.
supportive rule(Label,Head,Body):-
strict(Label,Head,Body).
supportive rule(Label,Head,Body):-
defeasible(Label,Head,Body).
rule(Label,Head,Body):-
supportive rule(Label,Head,Body).
rule(Label,Head,Body):-
defeater(Label,Head,Body).
The next clauses express monotonic provability.
c1 definitely(X) :-
fact(X).
c2 definitely(X) :-
strict(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
definitely(Y1),. . . ,definitely(Yn).
In the predicate expressing defeasible inference, defeasibly, one argument is written as a
subscript Z in the following clauses. That argument takes as its value one of the four proof
tags and represents the inference rule that should be applied to resolve conflict for the literal
in the other argument, unless the literal has a proof annotation. All clauses for predicates with
a subscript Z implicitly contain proof tag(Z) in their body. In clause c3 we see that free-
annotated literals are to be proved according to Z.
In clause c4, fail-expressions are defined: failure is implemented by negation. This is valid be-
cause the logics involved satisfy the Principle of Strong Negation. For such logics, the conditions
for−d inference rules are a negation of the conditions for +d inference rules. In both defeasible
logics and logic programming, failure-to-prove is a primitive notion, available in defeasible log-
ics through negative tags and in logic programming through negation. Hence, it is not surprising
that failure is implemented by negation in the meta-program.
The remaining two clauses are reflective of the basic structure of defeasible reasoning. Clause
c5 expresses that any literally that is definitely true (proved monotonically from facts and strict
rules) is also defeasibly true. Clause c6 handles an annotated literal by using the tag Y as the
subscript argument in subsidiary computations. This clause says that a literalX , annotated by Y ,
is proved if the negation of X is not proved monotonically and there is a supportive rule R that
is not overruled, each of whose body literals are proved defeasibly according to Y .
c3 defeasiblyZ(freeX) :-
proof tag(Z),
defeasiblyZ(Z X).
c4 defeasiblyZ(failX) :-
not defeasiblyZ(X).
c5 defeasiblyZ(X) :-
definitely(X).
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c6 defeasiblyZ(Y X) :-
proof tag(Y ),
not definitely(∼X),
supportive rule(R,X, [W1, . . . ,Wn]),
defeasiblyY(W1),. . . ,defeasiblyY(Wn),
not overruledY(R,X).
The basic structure of overruling a rule is similar for all defeasible logics: the body of the
overruling rule must be proved and the rule not “defeated”. However, it varies depending on
whether the logic blocks or propagates ambiguity. In an ambiguity blocking logic, the body of
the overruling rule must be established defeasibly whereas, in an ambiguity propagating logic,
the body of the overruling rule need only be supported.
c7 overruledZ(R,X) :-
ambiguity blocking(Z),
rule(S,∼X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
defeasiblyZ(U1),. . . ,defeasiblyZ(Un),
not defeatedZ(R,S,∼X).
c8 overruledZ(R,X) :-
ambiguity propagating(Z),
rule(S,∼X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
supportedZ(U1),. . . ,supportedZ(Un),
not defeatedZ(R,S,∼X).
The notion of defeat varies, depending on whether a logic involves team defeat or individual
defeat. In individual defeat, the overruling rule S is defeated if the rule R it tries to overrule is
superior to S. In team defeat, S is defeated if there is a rule T (possibly the same as R) that is
superior to S and whose body can be proved.
c9 defeatedZ(R,S,∼X) :-
team(Z),
sup(T, S),
supportive rule(T,X, [V1, . . . , Vn]),
defeasiblyZ(V1),. . . ,defeasiblyZ(Vn).
c10 defeatedZ(R,S,∼X) :-
indiv(Z),
sup(R,S).
The structure of this meta-program makes one point clear that was less readily apparent in
(Antoniou et al. 2000) or (Billington et al. 2010): treatment of ambiguity concerns how the body
of an overruling rule is proved, while the choice of team/individual defeat concerns how an
overruling rule can be defeated.
For the ambiguity propagating logics we must define the notion of “supported”. The intuition
is that a literal is supported if there is a chain of supportive rules that form a proof tree for the
literal, and each supportive rule is not beaten (i.e. overruled) by a rule that is proved defeasbily.
In ordinary defeasible logics support is only needed for the ambiguity propagating logics but, for
annotated defeasible theories, we also need to have support for ambiguity blocking logics. This
is because we might wish to use, as part of the support, a rule that contains an annotated literal
such as ∂q. Hence the supported predicate is defined uniformly, with a parameter Z specifying
the form of defeasibility underlying the support. Thus we are introducing new forms of support:
σ∂ and σ∂∗ .
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As with defeasibly, the clauses for supported address free literals, fail-expressions, literals
that are proved definitely, and proof-annotated literals. Note how the parameter Z to supported
is used by beaten to select the form of defeasibility for which the body of an overruling rule
must be proved.
c11 supportedZ(freeX) :-
supportedZ(Z X).
c12 supportedZ(failX) :-
not supportedZ(X).
c13 supportedZ(X) :-
definitely(X).
c14 supportedZ(Y X) :-
proof tag(Y ),
supportive rule(R,X, [W1, . . . ,Wn]),
supportedY(W1),. . . ,supportedY(Wn),
not beatenY(R,X).
c15 beatenZ(R,X) :-
rule(S,∼X, [W1, . . . ,Wn]),
defeasiblyZ(W1),. . . ,defeasiblyZ(Wn),
sup(S,R).
Let us now examine how to put annotated defeasible logic to work by revisiting the com-
pensation example presented in the introduction. As we have already discussed, Guilty must be
proven with the “beyond reasonable doubt” proof standard to derive that the defendant is entitled
to receive a compensation.
As we have alluded to in the introduction, (Gordon and Walton 2009) proposed to model proof
standards such as scintilla of evidence, preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing case,
beyond reasonable doubts and dialectical validity using rule based argumentation. For example,
they define that the proof standard of preponderance of evident for a literal p is satisfied if and
only if the maximumweight of applicable arguments for p exceeds some thresholdα, and the dif-
ference between the maximumweight of the applicable arguments for p and the maximumweight
of the applicable arguments against p exceeds some threshold β. (Governatori 2011) shows how
the weights and thresholds can be modelled by a preference relation (superiority) over arguments
(rules) and it establishes the following relationships between the proof standards and proof tags:
Proof standard(s) Proof tag
scintilla of evidence σ
preponderance of evidence, clear and convincing case ∂∗
beyond reasonable doubt, dialectic validity δ∗
where the distinction between preponderance of evidence and clear and convincing case, and
beyond reasonable doubt and dialectic validity depends on how the weights associated to the
arguments and thresholds are translated in instances of the superiority relation in the resulting
theories. Furthermore, (Governatori 2011) provides examples where the definitions of proof stan-
dards given in (Gordon and Walton 2009) exhibit some counter-intuitive conclusions. To obviate
such limitations he proposes an alternative correspondence between proof tags in defeasible logic
variants and proof standards, including the following:
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Proof standard(s) Proof tag
substantial evidence σ
preponderance of evidence ∂
beyond reasonable doubt δ
dialectic validity δ (when the superiority relation is ignored)
Thus, the proof standard of beyond reasonable doubt corresponds to defeasible provability
using ambiguity propagation. Accordingly, we can replace BeyondReasonableDoubt in rule r′5
with +δ. All the other literals appearing in the body of the rules do not require special proof
standards, and thus we can annotate them with free. Consequently, the formalization of this
scenario in annotated defeasible logic is:
r1 : free EvidenceA ⇒ ¬Responsible
r2 : free EvidenceB ⇒ Responsible
r3 : freeResponsible ⇒ Guilty
r4 : ⇒ ¬Guilty
r5 : +δ¬Guilty ⇒ Compensation
r6 : ⇒ ¬Compensation
It is easy to verify that we now derive +∂¬Compensation , that the defendant is not entitled to
compensation, as the scenario requires.
Properties of Annotated Defeasible Theories
We now investigate properties of annotated defeasible logic, exploiting its logic programming
underpinnings.
The first theorem relates the meta-program for annotated defeasible logic to the meta-programs
for existing defeasible logics DL(d). Those logics do not contain fail-expressions. We write
|=K for logical consequence under Kunen’s semantics (Kunen 1987). Recall thatMd(D) is the
meta-programming representation for D in DL(d), while M(α(D)) is the meta-programming
representation forD annotated by α.
Theorem 1
Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory, and α be an annotation function for that theory. Let
d ∈ {δ∗, δ, ∂∗, ∂}.
Suppose α(R) contains only annotations free and d, and there is no fail-expression in R.
Then, for every literal q
• M(α(D)) |=K defeasiblyd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K defeasibly(q)
• M(α(D)) |=K ¬defeasiblyd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K ¬defeasibly(q)
Furthermore, if d ∈ {δ∗, δ},
• M(α(D)) |=K supportedd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K supported(q)
• M(α(D)) |=K ¬supportedd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K ¬supported(q)
The proof is based on separately unfoldingM(α(D)) andMd(D) until they have essentially
the same form.
As an immediate corollary to this theorem, we see that annotated defeasible theories are a
conservative extension of defeasible theories. Let the free annotation function be the annotation
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∆ ⊂ δ∗ ⊂ δ ⊂ ∂ ⊂ σ∂ ⊂ σδ ⊂ σδ∗
⊂
⊂
∂∗ ⊂ σ∂∗
Fig. 1. Ordering of inference rules by relative inference strength.
function that maps every body literal occurrence in D to free. For any defeasible theory D,
the unannotated theory behaves exactly the same as the theory annotated by the free annotation
function.
Corollary 2
Suppose that αF is the free annotation function for D. Let d ∈ {δ
∗, δ, ∂∗, ∂}. Then, for every
literal q,
• M(αF (D)) |=K defeasiblyd(q) iffD ⊢ +dq
• M(αF (D)) |=K ¬defeasiblyd(q) iffD ⊢ −dq
Furthermore, if d ∈ {δ∗, δ},
• M(αF (D)) |=K supportedd(q) iffD ⊢ +σdq
• M(αF (D)) |=K ¬supportedd(q) iffD ⊢ −σdq
For any tag d and an annotated defeasible theory D we define +d(D) = {q | D ⊢ +dq} =
{q | M(D) |=K defeasiblyd(q)} and −d(D) = {q | D ⊢ −dq} = {q | M(D) |=K
¬defeasiblyd(q)}. Similarly, we define +σd(D) as {q | M(D) |=K supportedd(q)} and
−σd(D) as {q | M(D) |=K ¬supportedd(q)}.
We can now extend the inclusion theorem of (Billington et al. 2010) to the new tags and anno-
tated defeasible logic. This theorem shows the relative inference strength of the different forms
of defeasibility.
Theorem 3 (Inclusion Theorem)
LetD be an annotated defeasible theory.
(a) +∆(D) ⊆ +δ∗(D) ⊆ +δ(D) ⊆ +∂(D) ⊆ +σδ(D) ⊆ +σδ∗(D)
(b) −σδ∗(D) ⊆ −σδ(D) ⊆ −∂(D) ⊆ −δ(D) ⊆ −δ
∗(D) ⊆ −∆(D)
(c) +∂(D) ⊆ +σ∂(D) ⊆ +σδ(D)
(d) −σδ(D) ⊆ −σ∂(D) ⊆ −∂(D)
(e) +δ∗(D) ⊆ +∂∗(D) ⊆ +σ∂∗(D) ⊆ +σδ∗(D)
(f) −σδ∗(D) ⊆ −σ∂∗(D) ⊆ −∂
∗(D) ⊆ −δ∗(D)
The proof is by induction on the iteration stages of Fitting’s ΦM(D) function.
The inclusions in this theorem are presented graphically in Figure 1. The relation t1 ⊂ t2
expresses that, for all defeasible theories D, +t1(D) ⊆ +t2(D) and −t1(D) ⊇ −t2(D), and,
for some defeasible theory D, +t1(D) ⊂ +t2(D). The containments come from the theorem,
while their strictness is demonstrated by simple examples. Examples also show that there are no
containments that can be added to the figure.
This ordering on tags can be extended to annotation functions. Let α1 and α2 be annotation
functions for a defeasible theory D. We define α1 ⊑ α2 iff for every body occurrence o of
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every literal in D, α1(o) ⊂ α2(o). If such an ordering had implications for the conclusions of
the annotated theories, it would provide a useful basis from which to reason about annotated
defeasible theories. Unfortunately, the most obvious possibility – a kind of monotonicity – does
not hold, as the following example shows.
Example 4
LetD consist of the rules
r1 : ⇒ p r5 : q ⇒ s
r2 : ⇒ ¬p r6 : ⇒ ¬s
r3 : ⇒ q
r4 : ¬p ⇒ ¬q
with r5 > r6.
Let α1 map q in r5 to δ, and α2 map q in r5 to ∂ (with all other occurrences mapped to free).
Then α1 ⊑ α2. Rules r1 - r4 are a standard example distinguishing ambiguity blocking and
propagating behaviours. +∂q and −δq can be concluded. Consequently, in α1(D) we conclude
+∂¬s and −∂s while in α2(D) we conclude−∂¬s and +∂s.
Thus we see that a strengthening of the annotation function (in the ⊑ ordering) does not nec-
essarily lead to a strengthening of the conclusions of the annotated defeasible theory.
For the defeasible logics we address, the consequences of a defeasible theory can be computed
in linear time, with respect to the size of the theory (Maher 2001; Billington et al. 2010), but these
logics only support one form of defeasibility. Annotated defeasible logic allows the interaction
between the different inference rules but, nevertheless, we expect its consequences can also be
computed in linear time, although with a larger constant factor. (Certainly, it is straightforward
to show we can compute consequences in quadratic time. See the supplementary material.) Let
C(D) = {+dq | M(D) |=K defeasiblyd(q), d ∈ T } ∪
{−dq | M(D) |=K ¬defeasiblyd(q), d ∈ T } ∪
{+σdq | M(D) |=K supportedd(q), d ∈ T } ∪
{−σdq | M(D) |=K ¬supportedd(q), d ∈ T }
where D is an annotated defeasible theory, T = {∂, ∂∗, δ, δ∗} refers to the four main forms of
defeasibility, and q ranges over annotated literals.
Conjecture 5
Let D be an annotated defeasible theory, and |D| be the number of symbols in D. Then the set
of consequences C(D) can be computed in time O(|D|).
Different Forms of Failure
One advantage of the framework of (Maher and Governatori 1999; Antoniou et al. 2000) is that
different notions of failure can be obtained by different semantics for logic programs. In this
section we demonstrate that annotated defeasible logic is a conservative extension of those logics
for many such semantics.
Many of the logic programming semantics we will focus on can be seen to be derived from
the 3-valued stable models (Przymusinski 1990) (also known as partial stable models, but dis-
tinct from partial stable models in (Sacca` and Zaniolo 1990)). In addition to the semantics based
on all partial stable models, there is the well-founded model (Gelder et al. 1991), which is the
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least partial stable model under the information ordering (Przymusinski 1990) (called F -least
in (Przymusinski 1990)); the (2-valued) stable models (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988); the regular
models (You and Yuan 1994), which are the maximal partial stable models under set inclusion
on the positive literals; and the L-stable models (Eiter et al. 1997), which are the maximal partial
stable models under set inclusion on positive and negative literals or, equivalently, the minimal
partial stable models under set inclusion on the undefined literals. The interest in these semantics
derives from the use of their counterparts in abstract argumentation (Caminada et al. 2015).
Let S denote the collection of semantics mentioned above, with the exception of the stable
semantics. That is, S = {partial stable,well–founded , regular ,L–stable,Kunen,Fitting}.
These semantics (and the stable semantics) are preserved by unfolding (see (Aravindan and Dung 1995;
Maher 2017)). Consequently, Theorem 1 extends to the semantics in S:
Theorem 6
Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory, and α be an annotation for that theory. Let d ∈
{δ∗, δ, ∂∗, ∂}. Supposeα(R) contains only annotations free and d, and there is no fail-expression
in R. Let S ∈ S. Then
• M(α(D)) |=S defeasiblyd(q) iffMd(D) |=S defeasibly(q)
• M(α(D)) |=S ¬defeasiblyd(q) iffMd(D) |=S ¬defeasibly(q)
and, if d ∈ {δ∗, δ},
• M(α(D)) |=S supportedd(q) iffMd(D) |=S supported(q)
• M(α(D)) |=S ¬supportedd(q) iffMd(D) |=S ¬supported(q)
More generally, the S-models of M(α(D)) restricted to defeasiblyd are identical (up to
predicate renaming) to the S-models ofMd(D) restricted to defeasibly.
In particular, annotated defeasible logic under the well-founded semantics extends the well-
founded defeasible logics (Maher and Governatori 1999; Maher et al. 2011).
This theorem does not apply to the stable model semantics, because of the possibility that
Md(D) has stable models butM(D) does not. This, in turn, occurs becauseM(D) represents
all the inference rules, whileMd(D) does not. Technically, the proof fails because the deletion
of irrelevant clauses is not sound under the stable model semantics. To see what can go wrong,
consider the following example.
Example 7
LetD consist of the rules
r1 : ⇒ p r3 : ⇒ q
r2 : p, q ⇒ ¬p r4 : ⇒ q
r5 : ⇒ ¬q
r6 : ⇒ ¬q
with r3 > r5 and r4 > r6.
After unfoldings and simplifications,M(D) contains
c16 defeasibly∂ (∂ p) :-
not overruled∂ (r1, p).
c17 overruled∂ (r1, p) :-
defeasibly∂ (∂ p),
defeasibly∂ (∂ q).
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and similar clauses for ∂∗ (as well as other clauses).
It is clear that if defeasibly∂(∂ q) holds then the structure of these two clauses prevents
the existence of a stable model, while if ¬defeasibly∂(∂ q) then defeasibly∂(∂ p) holds in
every stable model, assuming there is nothing else preventing the formation of stable models.
The same applies for ∂∗.
Now, defeasibly∂(∂ q) holds, but defeasibly∂∗(∂
∗ q) does not. It follows, from the proof
of Theorem 1, thatM∂∗(D) has stable models butM(D) does not.
Thus Theorem 6 holds for stable models only when all forms of defeasibility and supported-
ness have stable models.
Related Work
Among the features of annotated defeasible theories are: (1) the language supportsmultiple forms
of defeasibility within a single defeasible theory, indeed within a single rule; (2) the language
provides explicit fail-expressions; (3) the framework has the ability to incorporate different no-
tions of failure-to-prove, corresponding to different semantics of negation-as-failure. No other
formalism for defeasible reasoning has all these features.
Courteous logic programs (Grosof 1997) (and later developments (Wan et al. 2009;Wan et al. 2015))
permit negation-as-failure expressions in defeasible rules, which are essentially the same as fail-
expressions. (Antoniou et al. 2000) discussed a specific transformation for eliminating these ex-
pressions from courteous logic programs; that transformation is not sound for ambiguity propa-
gating logics. Our meta-programmingapproach to fail-expressionswas discussed in (Maher and Governatori 1999),
for a language with a single form of defeasibility, and our Theorem 1 extends to languages with
such fail-expressions.
Within proof-theoretic treatments of defeasible logics (see, for example (Maier and Nute 2010)
and (Billington et al. 2010)) the logics can incorporate multiple forms of defeasibility, but they
don’t interact. For example, the proof of+∂q cannot depend on the proof of+δp: it can only de-
pend on proofs of ∂ conclusions.Within the meta-programming framework of (Maher and Governatori 1999;
Antoniou et al. 2000) a logic has only a single form of defeasibility, although this can be easily
remedied by the use of multiple variants of the defeasibly predicate. Still, the multiple forms
don’t interact. Structured argumentation approaches, such as ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010), use unan-
notated rules without an inference rule (in the sense above) and hence define a single form of
defeasibility. A meta-program component of the languages LPDA and ASPDA (Wan et al. 2009;
Wan et al. 2015), called an argumentation theory, is capable of specifying a different inference
rule for each literal, but not for each occurrence of each literal. Thus, although they providemore
interaction than the defeasible logics, they do not provide the ability to apply different inference
rules to the same atom.
It should be noted that the logics of (Billington et al. 2010) are able to simulate each other
(Maher 2012; Maher 2013) (and ASPIC+ appears expressive enough to simulate these logics),
but such an approach to incorporating multiple forms of defeasibility leads to an unnatural rep-
resentation and has computational penalties. It also fails to represent free-expressions, since the
top level form of defeasibility must be fixed before simulations can be coded.
Annotated logic programs (Kifer and Subrahmanian 1992) are an extension of logic programs
to multi-valued logics, where the truth values are assumed to form an upper semi-lattice. Atoms
in the body are annotated by truth values and the head is annotated by a function of those truth
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values. Thus there are some similarities to annotated defeasible logic, in the use of annotations,
including a similarity of variable annotations and free-expressions. However, annotated defeasi-
ble logic uses proof tags – not truth values – as annotations, and does not assume any ordering on
the annotations. Further, the semantics of annotated logic programs is essentially a disjunction
of the conclusions of rules, so this formalism is unable to represent the overriding of a rule by a
competing rule.
Most defeasible logics support a single semantics of failure: Kunen’s (Billington et al. 2010),
well-founded (Maher and Governatori 1999; Maier and Nute 2010; Maher et al. 2011; Grosof 1997;
Wan et al. 2009), stable (Verheij 2003; Maier 2013; Wan et al. 2015). Apart from the framework
of (Antoniou et al. 2000), the only defeasible formalisms supportingmultiple semantics are struc-
tured argumentation languages like ASPIC+ (Prakken 2010). But such languages do not support
multiple forms of defeasibility.
The annotation mechanism we presented is closely related to the introduction of modal literals
in modal defeasible logic (Governatori et al. 2016), where each rule is labelled with the mode
(✷) its conclusion can be proved and the literals ✷q and ✸q correspond to +∂✷q and −∂✷¬q.
While each modality has its own inference rule, each supports a single form of defeasibility. This
raised the question whether different forms of defeasibility could be combined: the present paper
offers a positive answer.
Conclusion
We have argued that we need a formalism that supports different kinds of defeasible reasoning,
and introduced annotated defeasible logic to fulfil that requirement. The semantics of the anno-
tated logic is defined through a logic program, and we are able to exploit that medium to prove
properties of the logic.
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Inference Rules
Defeasible logics are usually defined via their proof mechanism. Here we present the infer-
ence rules for the four defeasible logics we integrate within annotated defeasible logic. Each
inference rule is labelled by the kind of conclusions it infers. The presentation is adapted from
(Billington et al. 2010). A defeasible logic is determined by the inference rules it allows. For
example,DL(∂) allows +∂ and −∂, whileDL(δ) allows +δ, −δ, +σδ, and −σδ .
A proofP is a sequence of conclusions. The conclusion at position i in the sequence is denoted
by P (i), and a prefix of the proof of length i is denoted by P [1..i]. The inference rules establish
when a conclusion can be drawn at position i+1, given the conclusions already proved (P [1..i]).
Where q is a literal, Rsd[q] denotes the set of strict or defeasible rules with head q, while R[q]
denotes the set of all rules (including defeaters) with head q. For a rule r, A(r) denotes the
antecedent (or body) of r.
+∂) Infer P (i+ 1) = +∂q if either
.1) +∆q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) The following three conditions all hold.
.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r),+∂a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) −∆∼q ∈ P [1..i], and
.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(s),−∂a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(t),+∂a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) t > s.
−∂) Infer P (i+ 1) = −∂q if
.1) −∆q ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) either
.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r),−∂a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) +∆∼q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(s),+∂a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(t),−∂a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) not(t > s).
+δ) Infer P (i+ 1) = +δq if either
.1) +∆q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) The following three conditions all hold.
.1) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] ∀a ∈ A(r),+δa ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) −∆∼q ∈ P [1..i], and
.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(s),−σδa ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃t ∈ Rsd[q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(t),+δa ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) t > s.
−δ) Infer P (i + 1) = −δq if
.1) −∆q ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) either
.1) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] ∃a ∈ A(r),−δa ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) +∆∼q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(s),+σδa ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀t ∈ Rsd[q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(t),−δa ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) not(t > s).
+σδ) Infer P (i+ 1) = +σδq if either
.1) +∆q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(r),+σδa ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(s),−δa ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) not(s > r).
−σδ) Infer P (i+ 1) = −σδq if
.1) −∆q ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(r),−σδa ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(s),+δa ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) s > r.
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+∂∗) Infer P (i+ 1) = +∂∗q if either
.1) +∆q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(r),+∂∗a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) −∆∼q ∈ P [1..i], and
.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(s),−∂∗a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) r > s.
−∂∗) Infer P (i + 1) = −∂∗q if
.1) −∆q ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(r),−∂∗a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) +∆∼q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(s),+∂∗a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) not(r > s).
+δ∗) Infer P (i+ 1) = +δ∗q if either
.1) +∆q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(r),+δ∗a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) −∆∼q ∈ P [1..i], and
.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(s),−σ∗δ∗a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) r > s.
−δ∗) Infer P (i+ 1) = −δ∗q if
.1) −∆q ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(r),−δ∗a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) +∆∼q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(s),+σ∗δ∗a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) not(r > s).
+σ∗δ∗) Infer P (i+ 1) = +σ
∗
δ∗q if either
.1) +∆q ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd[q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(r),+σ∗δ∗a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(s),−δ∗a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) not(s > r).
−σ∗δ∗) Infer P (i+ 1) = −σ
∗
δ∗q if
.1) −∆q ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd[q] either
.1) ∃a ∈ A(r),−σ∗δ∗a ∈ P [1..i]; or
.2) ∃s ∈ R[∼q] such that
.1) ∀a ∈ A(s),+δ∗a ∈ P [1..i], and
.2) s > r.
Original Meta-programs
The original metaprograms (Maher and Governatori 1999; Antoniou et al. 2000) for the fourmain
forms of defeasibility are outlined below. They consist of clauses c1 and c2, defining definitely,
clauses defining rule and supportive rule (see body of the paper), and a selection of the fol-
lowing clauses for each form of defeasibility.
c21 defeasibly(X) :-
definitely(X).
c22 defeasibly(X) :-
not definitely(∼X),
supportive rule(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
defeasibly(Y1),. . . ,defeasibly(Yn),
not overruled(R,X).
c23 overruled(R,X) :-
rule(S,∼X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
defeasibly(U1),. . . ,defeasibly(Un),
not defeated(S,∼X).
c24 defeated(S,∼X) :-
sup(T, S),
supportive rule(T,X, [V1, . . . , Vn]),
defeasibly(V1),. . . ,defeasibly(Vn).
Annotated Defeasible Logic 19
c25 supported(X) :-
definitely(X).
c26 supported(X) :-
supportive rule(R,X, [Y1, . . . , Yn]),
supported(Y1),. . . ,supported(Yn),
not beaten(R,X).
c27 beaten(R,X) :-
rule(S,∼X, [W1, . . . ,Wn]),
defeasibly(W1),. . . ,defeasibly(Wn),
sup(S,R).
c28 overruled(R,X) :-
rule(S,∼X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
supported(U1),. . . ,supported(Un),
not defeated(S,∼X).
c29 overruled(R,X) :-
rule(S,∼X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
defeasibly(U1),. . . ,defeasibly(Un),
not sup(R,S).
c30 overruled(R,X) :-
rule(S,∼X, [U1, . . . , Un]),
supported(U1),. . . ,supported(Un),
not sup(R,S).
The selection of clauses for each meta-program is as follows:
M∂ contains the clauses c21 - c24.
Mδ contains the clauses c21 - c22, c28, c24, and c25 - c27.
M∂∗ contains the clauses c21 - c22, and c29.
Mδ∗ consists of the clauses c21 - c22, c30, and c25 - c27.
Proofs of results
We present (sketches of) proofs for the results in the paper.
Theorem 1
Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory, and α be an annotation function for that theory. Let
d ∈ {δ∗, δ, ∂∗, ∂}.
Suppose α(R) contains only annotations free and d, and there is no fail-expression in R.
Then, for every literal q
• M(α(D)) |=K defeasiblyd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K defeasibly(q)
• M(α(D)) |=K ¬defeasiblyd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K ¬defeasibly(q)
Furthermore, if d ∈ {δ∗, δ},
• M(α(D)) |=K supportedd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K supported(q)
• M(α(D)) |=K ¬supportedd(d q) iffMd(D) |=K ¬supported(q)
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Proof
(Sketch) The proof of this theorem is similar for each tag d. For brevity, we only provide the
details for δ. The proof is based on unfoldingM(α(D)) until it has essentially the same form as
an unfolding ofMd(D). The form of unfolding we use uses clauses from the current program,
andmay be applied as long as no clause is used to unfold an atom in its own body. Such unfolding
preserves the Kunen semantics (i.e. 3-valuedmodels of the Clark-completion) of a logic program
by essentially the same argument that it preserves the 2-valued models (Maher 1988). Clauses
c1, c2, and c5 are the same in bothM andMd, so we will essentially ignore them.
In bothM(α(D)) andMδ(D) we unfold all occurrences of the predicates used to represent
the annotated defeasible theory, and rule and supportive rule. Then, inM(α(D)), we un-
fold all occurrences of the predicates specifying the type of each tag: ambiguity propagating,
ambiguity blocking, proof tag, team, and indiv. At this point clauses derived from c6-c8
are ground, while clauses derived from c10 only have a single, unused variableX in their heads.
Similarly, clauses derived from c14 and c15 are ground.
Then unfold all defeasiblyZ(free L) atoms. This will not result in a clause unfolding it-
self: in c3 because Z is not free, and in c6 because Y is not free. Similarly, we unfold all
supportedZ(free L) atoms. As a result, free only occurs in the head of clauses derived from
c3 and c11.
Finally, unfold all M(α(D)) and defeated atoms in Mδ(D). At this stage, clauses de-
rived from Mδ(D) are essentially the same as some of the clauses derived from M(α(D))
with subscript δ; the differences are in the name/arity of predicates (e.g., defeasibly ver-
sus defeasiblyδ) and the presence of rules with heads of the form defeasiblyδ(free L),
supportedδ(free L), defeasiblyδ(fail L) or supportedδ(fail L). However, no atom
with subscript δ depends on a predicate with a different subscript, nor on clauses with free
or fail in the head. Hence, the consequences of M(D) of the form defeasiblyδ(q) and
supportedδ(q) are unaffected by the presence or absence of such rules, and so we delete them
all.
Consequently, the two transformed programs are the same (modulo predicate renaming), and
hence have the same conclusions. Since the transformations preserve the semantics of the pro-
grams, the result follows.
Corollary 2
Suppose that αF is the free annotation function for D. Let d ∈ {δ
∗, δ, ∂∗, ∂}. Then, for every
literal q,
• M(αF (D)) |=K defeasiblyd(q) iffD ⊢ +dq
• M(αF (D)) |=K ¬defeasiblyd(q) iffD ⊢ −dq
Furthermore, if d ∈ {δ∗, δ},
• M(αF (D)) |=K supportedd(q) iffD ⊢ +σdq
• M(αF (D)) |=K ¬supportedd(q) iffD ⊢ −σdq
Proof
The corollary follows from applying the previous theorem for each tag d to the case where α is
the free annotation function, and the correctness of the individual meta-programs.
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Theorem 3 (Inclusion Theorem)
LetD be an annotated defeasible theory.
(a) +∆(D) ⊆ +δ∗(D) ⊆ +δ(D) ⊆ +∂(D) ⊆ +σδ(D) ⊆ +σδ∗(D)
(b) −σδ∗(D) ⊆ −σδ(D) ⊆ −∂(D) ⊆ −δ(D) ⊆ −δ
∗(D) ⊆ −∆(D)
(c) +∂(D) ⊆ +σ∂(D) ⊆ +σδ(D)
(d) −σδ(D) ⊆ −σ∂(D) ⊆ −∂(D)
(e) +δ∗(D) ⊆ +∂∗(D) ⊆ +σ∂∗(D) ⊆ +σδ∗(D)
(f) −σδ∗(D) ⊆ −σ∂∗(D) ⊆ −∂
∗(D) ⊆ −δ∗(D)
Proof
(Sketch) LetΦ = ΦM(D) be Fitting’s semantic function for the logic programM(D) (Fitting 1985).
Recall that Kunen’s semantics is the set of all consequences of Φ ↑ n for any finite n. We prove
the containments by induction on the iteration of Φ. For brevity, we omit parts of the induction
hypothesis related to proving (a). We also omit the parts related to (b), (d) and (f) since, by the
Principle of Strong Negation (Antoniou et al. 2000), their statements and proof are symmetric to
those for the positive conclusions. The induction hypothesis contains
supported∂∗ ⊆ supportedδ∗ ∧ beatenδ∗ ⊆ beaten∂∗ ∧
supported∂ ⊆ supportedδ ∧ beatenδ ⊆ beaten∂ ∧
defeasibly∂∗ ⊆ supported∂∗ ∧ beaten∂∗ ⊆ overruled∂∗ ∧
defeasiblyδ∗ ⊆ defeasibly∂∗ ∧ overruled∂∗ ⊆ overruledδ∗ ∧
defeasibly∂∗ ⊆ supportedδ∗ ∧ beatenδ∗ ⊆ overruled∂∗
Clearly this statement holds in the empty interpretation. It is mostly straightforward to show
that if the induction hypothesis holds in Φ ↑ n then it holds in Φ ↑ n+1. For example, con-
sider the first two containments in the induction hypothesis. If they hold in Φ ↑ n (and also
defeasiblyδ∗ ⊆ defeasibly∂∗ holds) then, applying clause c15, the second containment
holds in Φ ↑ n+1 and, applying clause c14, the first containment holds in Φ ↑ n+1. To address
fail-expressions we also need the corresponding versions of these containments and arguments
for negative conclusions.
One containment, defeasibly∂ ⊆ supported∂ is not easily proved by induction, but it
has a direct proof. For a set S = Φ ↑ n, if defeasibly∂(x) ∈ Φ(S) then there is a sup-
portive rule r whose body literals are defeasibly true in S (i.e. defeasibly∂(wi) ∈ S) and
not overruled∂(r, x) ∈ S. Now not overruled∂(r, x) ∈ S only if, for every rule s for ∼x
whose body literals are defeasibly true in S, there is a supportive rule twhose body literals are de-
feasibly true in S and t > s. SinceD is finite and > is acyclic, for some such t, for every such s,
s 6> t. This t can now be used as r in clauses c14 and c15 to show that supported∂(x) ∈ Φ(S).
As mentioned in the body of the paper, it is straightforward to compute the consequences of
an annotated defeasible theory in quadratic time. We outline the proof.
Proposition 4
Let D be an annotated defeasible theory, and |D| be the number of symbols in D. Then the set
of consequences C(D) can be computed in time O(|D|2).
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Proof
(Sketch) Consider the grounding of the clauses, by unfolding with the input representation of
the defeasible theory and related facts, and the worst-case (i.e. maximum) size of the result.
Unfolding with facts like proof tag produces an increase in rules by a constant factor, because
the number of tags is fixed. Unfolding clauses for rule etc. produces a set of ground instances
linear in the size of rules inD. For clauses c1 and c2, the size of ground instances is proportional
to the size of facts/strict rules in D. The size of ground instances of clauses c6, c14, and c15 is
proportional to the size of rules inD. The size of ground instances of clauses c10 is proportional
to the number of superiority statements inD. The size of ground instances of clauses c3 – c5 and
c11 – c13 is proportional to the number of literals in D.
For clauses c7 and c8, the size of the ground instances is proportional to the product of the
number of rules inD and the maximum size of rules inD. The size of ground instances of clauses
c9 is proportional to the product of the number of superiority statements and the maximum size
of rules inD.
Thus the size of all ground clauses is bounded above by |D|2. The ground rules form an
essentially propositional logic program. Computing the consequences of a propositional logic
program under the Kunen semantics is linear in the size of the program. Consequently, the cost
of computing the conclusions is O(|D|2).
Recall that S = {partial stable,well–founded , regular ,L–stable,Kunen,Fitting} is a set
of semantics. These semantics (and the stable semantics) are preserved by unfolding (with the
Kunen semantics requiring the restriction on a rule unfolding itself). This was established for the
well-founded (Seki 1993; Aravindan and Dung 1995) and stable models (Maher 1990; Aravindan and Dung 1995),
and in (Maher 2017) for the partial stable models and the L-stable models. For the Kunen and
Fitting semantics it follows the same proof as in (Maher 1988) for the 2-valued Clark completion
semantics. Consequently, Theorem 1 extends to the semantics in S:
Theorem 6
Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory, and α be an annotation for that theory. Let d ∈
{δ∗, δ, ∂∗, ∂}. Supposeα(R) contains only annotations free and d, and there is no fail-expression
in R. Let S ∈ S. Then
• M(α(D)) |=S defeasiblyd(q) iffMd(D) |=S defeasibly(q)
• M(α(D)) |=S ¬defeasiblyd(q) iffMd(D) |=S ¬defeasibly(q)
and, if d ∈ {δ∗, δ},
• M(α(D)) |=S supportedd(q) iffMd(D) |=S supported(q)
• M(α(D)) |=S ¬supportedd(q) iffMd(D) |=S ¬supported(q)
More generally, the S-models of M(α(D)) restricted to defeasiblyd are identical (up to
predicate renaming) to the S-models ofMd(D) restricted to defeasibly.
Proof
The proof of Theorem 1 also applies to this theorem, since unfolding (without self-unfolding)
preserves models for all semantics in S (see Theorem 3.2 of (Maher 2017)), as does deletion of
irrelevant clauses.
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Examples
We present some counterexamples, to show that Figure 1 does not omit any containments and
that all the containments are strict. For these examples we do not need to use any annotations:
they equally apply to (unannotated) defeasible theories, and we present them in that form.
There are four possible containments we must show do not hold: δ 6⊆ ∂∗, σδ 6⊆ σ∂∗ , ∂ 6⊆ σδ ,
and δ 6⊆ σ∂∗ . We have two examples that demonstrate these four points.
Example 7
Let the defeasible theoryD consist of the rules
r1 : ⇒ p
r2 : ⇒ ¬p
r3 : ⇒ q
r4 : ¬p ⇒ ¬q
r5 : q ⇒ s
r6 : ⇒ ¬s
with r5 > r6.
Rules r1 - r4 are a standard example distinguishing ambiguity blocking and propagating be-
haviours.+∂∗q and−δq can be concluded. Thus, δ 6⊆ ∂∗. In addition, we conclude−σ∂∗¬s and
+σδ¬s. Thus, σδ 6⊆ σ∂∗ .
Now we show that ∂ 6⊆ σδ and δ 6⊆ σ∂∗ .
Example 8
Consider the following defeasible theoryD:
r1 : p ⇒ ¬q r5 : ⇒ p
r2 : ⇒ q r6 : ⇒ p
r3 : q ⇒ ¬s r7 : ⇒ ¬p
r4 : ⇒ s r8 : ⇒ ¬p
with r1 > r2, r5 > r7, r6 > r8
Then we have +δp and −∂∗p. Consequently, we have −σδq and +∂
∗q. Hence, ∂ 6⊆ σδ .
Furthermore, we have+δs and −∂∗s. Hence δ 6⊆ σ∂∗ .
Hence, there are no containments missing from Figure 1.
That the containments in the top row of Figure 1 are strict was mostly established in (Billington et al. 2010).
The strictness of containments between forms of support follows straightforwardly from the
strictness of containment for the corresponding forms of defeasibility. For the remaining con-
tainments, consider the following example.
Example 9
Consider the following defeasible theoryD:
r1 : p ⇒ q
r2 : ⇒ ¬q
r3 : ⇒ p
r4 : ⇒ ¬p
We have −∂∗p (and −∂∗¬p) but +σδ∗p. Consequently, we have +∂
∗¬q but −δ∗¬q, showing
that δ∗ ⊂ ∂∗ onD.
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Note also that we have conclusions −dp and +σdp for any defeasible proof tag d. Hence
+∂ ⊂ σ∂ and +∂
∗ ⊂ σ∂∗
Hence all the containments in Figure 1 are strict.
